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Abstract: In the Google Spain judgment, the Grand Chamber of the EU’s Court of 
Justice determined the circumstances in which a search engine is obliged to remove 
links to data pertaining to an individual from the results displayed by its search engine. 
The Court also considered the material and territorial scope of the EU data protection 
rules. This note argues that the Court’s findings, which have been heavily criticised, are 
normatively coherent. The broad scope of application of data protection rules and the 
right of individuals to have their data deleted when certain conditions are fulfilled both 
play a part in granting individuals effective control over their personal data - an 
objective of EU data protection law. 
Keywords: data protection, privacy, EU charter, search engine, freedom of expression, 
intermediary liability  
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INTRODUCTION 
After almost two decades of obscurity, data protection law has been propelled intothe 
limelight in recent years. The reform of the EU data protection regime proposed by the 
European Commission in 2012, the Snowden revelations of 2013 and the first use of the EU 
Charter to annul an entire piece of secondary legislation – the Data Retention Directive – 
have all contributed to the rise to prominence of this longstanding policy. The most recent 
data protection development to attract widespread global attention has been the judgment of 
the Court of Justice (the Court) in Google Spain
1
, discussed in this note.  
In Google Spain the Court was asked to determine what obligations – if any – EU data 
protection law imposes on search engines, in this instance Google, vis-à-vis individuals who 
seek to suppress information relating to them which is lawfully available online. The Court 
held that when a person is searched for by name in Google’s search engine, Google is obliged 
to remove links to web pages from the results its search engine displays if the processing of 
this data is incompatiblewith the provisions of the Data Protection Directive. These links 
must be removed irrespective of whether the web pages themselves continue to be lawful. It 
has been this finding of the Court which provoked the most controversy, in particular because 
of the Court’s failure to address its freedom of expression implications. At the heart of the 
matter is the divisive issue of default control over information: should individuals be entitled 
to control the dissemination of their personal data or should the claim that this information 
belongs in the public domain prevail?  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
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 Case 131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja 
González [2014] ECR I-000, nyr.    
Mr Costeja Gonzalez was involved in insolvency proceedings relating to social security debts 
in the late 1990s. These proceedings were reported in a regional newspaper in Spain in 1998 
and the article was later made available online. Mr Costeja Gonzalez, who was named in the 
report, asked the newspaper to delete the piece arguing that the insolvency proceedings were 
concluded and it was no longer of  relevance. The newspaper refused to erase the data on the 
basis that the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs had ordered its publication. Mr Costeja 
Gonzalez also asked  Google Spain  to remove links to the newspaper in its search results 
when his name was entered as a search term in the Google search engine: Google Spain sent 
this request to Google Inc. in the United States.  
Mr Costeja Gonzalez theno addressed a complaint to the Spanish Data Protection Authority 
(DPA). The DPA rejected the complaint against the newspaper on the grounds that the 
publication of such data in the press was legally justified. However, the DPA upheld the 
complaint against Google Spain and Google Inc., requesting that the contested links be 
removed from Google’s index of search results.  
Google sought the annulment of this decision before the Audencia Nacional which stayed the 
proceedings in order to refer a number of questions to the Court of Justice. The questions 
referred to the Court can be grouped into three sets of issues relating to, first, the material 
scope of application of the Data Protection Directive; second, its territorial scope of 
application; and third, the application of the data subject’s right to delete personal data under 
existing data protection rules. Advocate General Jääskinen was tasked with delivering an 
Opinion on the proceedings. The Court and the Advocate General agreed on the Directive’s 
territorial scope of application. However, this was one of the rare instances in which the 
Court departed from the Advocate General’s Opinion: its findings differed significantly from 
those of the Advocate General on the material scope of the Directive and, ostensibly, on the 
substantive issue concerning the data subject’s right to delete. More fundamentally, as will be 
discussed below, the Court’s judgment and the Advocate General’s Opinion reveal their 
differing conceptions of the desired role of data protection in the EU legal order.   
THE MATERIAL AND PERSONAL SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE 
In order to determine whether the Data Protection Directive
2
 applied to Google’s search 
engine activities, the Spanish court asked the Court of Justice whether the activities of a 
search engine constitute ‘processing of personal data’ for the purposes of Article 2(b) of the 
Directive and, if so, whether a search engine operator is a ‘data controller’ within the 
meaning of Article 2(d). 
Article 2(b) of the Directive defines ‘processing of personal data’ as ‘any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means’. It 
then goes on to give a non-exhaustive list of such operations. The Court noted that the 
activities of a search engine – which ‘collects’, ‘retrieves’, ‘records’, ‘organises’, ‘discloses’ 
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 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
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and ‘makes available’ personal data – must be classified as ‘processing’.3 Google had argued 
that knowledge of the data – in particular, whether specific data are personal or not – was 
required for operations to be classified as ‘processing’4, an argument which was rejected by 
the Court.
5
 Neither, according to the Court, did Google need to alter the data already 
published online for its actions to constitute data processing
6
 as to require such alteration 
would be to deprive the Directive of its effect.
7
    
The Court then considered whether Google constituted a ‘data controller’. A ‘data controller’ 
is an entity which ‘alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data’.8 Obligations are place on data controllers pursuant to the 
Directive. In opining that Google was not a ‘data controller’, the Advocate General 
emphasised that Google does not distinguish between source web pages which contain 
personal data and those which do not.
9
 In particular, he specified that the files which Google 
processes contain ‘personal data and other data in a haphazard, indiscriminate and random 
manner’.10 He proposed a factual rather than a formalistic assessment of whether an entity is 
responsible for data processing and suggested that such responsibility should hinge on 
whether the entity responsible was firstly, ‘aware of the existence of a certain defined 
category of information amounting to “personal data”’ and, secondly, that the controller 
‘processes this data with some intention which relates to their processing as personal data.’11  
The Court, however, refused to encompass a ‘knowledge’ or ‘intention’ criterion in the 
notion of ‘data controller’. Resorting to both a literal and teleological interpretation of the 
Directive, the Court held that a search engine should not be excluded from the definition of 
controller
12
 and,in this way, the Court preserved the broad personal scope of application of 
the Data Protection Directive.  
THE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 
Article 4(1) of the Directive determines its territorial scope of application. It provides that the 
rules of a Member State apply when, inter alia, the processing is carried out by a data 
controller established in a Member State or if a controller established outside the EU makes 
use of equipment on the territory of the Member State for the purposes of processing. 
Google argued that it was neither established nor making use of equipment in Spain and 
therefore did not fall within the scope of Spanish data protection rules in this context. It 
argued that Google Spain acts only as a commercial representative of Google for its 
advertising activities – promoting and selling advertising space on Google – and is not 
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involved in the search engine activities under examination. Moreover, it denied that it ‘makes 
use of equipment’ for the provision of search engine services in Spain claiming that the use of 
web spiders to index content does not constitute ‘use of equipment’. 
The Advocate General and the Court of Justice were in agreement that Google Spain did fall 
within the territorial scope of the Directive with both taking a functional approach to Article 
4(1). The Advocate General emphasised the need to take the business model of internet 
search engines into consideration. The provision of free search engine services is cross-
subsidised by the revenue generated by keyword advertising services. Therefore, a company 
is established in a Member State for the purposes of the Directive if the revenue-generating 
limb of the enterprise, which subsidises the technical processing operations taking place 
elsewhere, is established in that Member State.
13
 The Advocate General opined that Google 
should be viewed as a single economic unit, a concept borrowed from Competition law, for 
the purposes of establishing the territorial applicability of the Directive.
14
   
The Court reached an identical conclusion by aligning itself more closely to the Directive’s 
wording. It noted that, pursuant to the Directive’s recitals, ‘establishment on the territory of a 
Member State implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable 
arrangements’.15 As Google Spain engages in such effective and real exercise of activity 
through stable arrangements, it constitutes an establishment.
16
 The question was then whether 
the relevant personal data processing was ‘carried out in the context of the activities’ of its 
establishment. The Court distinguished between processing carried out ‘by’ the established 
entity  and processing carried out ‘in the context of the activities’ of the establishment.17 It 
found that the processing of personal data for Google’s search engine services was processing 
‘carried out in the context of the activities’ of Google Spain’s establishment as Google Spain 
promoted and sold advertising space in Spain which rendered Google’s search engine 
services profitable.
18
 This cross-subsidisation ‘inextricably links’19 the activities of the search 
engine and its establishment in Spain: a finding to the contrary would compromise the 
effectiveness of the Directive according to the Court.
20
 This finding is in keeping with the 
Court’s insistence that a broad interpretation of the Directive’s territorial scope was intended 
by the legislature and necessary in order to ensure the effective and complete protection of 
fundamental rights.
21
  
 THE RIGHTS FLOWING FROM THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE  
Perhaps the most contentious issue before the Court was whether an obligation flowed from 
the provisions of the Directive – in particular Articles 12(b) and 14(a)– for a search engine 
operator to remove links to (otherwise) lawful material published on third party webpages.  
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It follows from Article 12(b) of the Directive that data subjects have the right to obtain from 
the data controller ‘the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does 
not comply with the provisions of Directive 95/46, in particular because of the incomplete or 
inaccurate nature of the data’. The Court noted that the examples of incompatible data 
processing in Article 12(b) are not exhaustive.
22
 It recalled that in order to be compatible with 
the Directive processing must also comply with the data quality principles in Article 6 and 
have a legitimate legal basis pursuant to Article 7.
23
 The legal basis for data processing in the 
present case was Article 7(f)
24
 which permits data processing that is necessary for legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or third parties to whom the data are disclosed, except 
where these interests are overridden by the rights and freedoms of the individual data subject. 
It therefore requires a balancing of ‘the opposing rights and interests of the data subject and 
the data controller, while taking into account the Charter rights to data protection and 
privacy.’25 The reliance on Article 7(f) as a legal basis for the data processing brings Article 
14(a) into the legal picture. This provisionallows the data subject to object to processing 
conducted on the basis of Article 7(f) by advancing compelling legitimate grounds relating to 
his particular situation, save where otherwise provided by national legislation.
26
  
The Court identified the data subject’s right to privacy and data protection on the one hand 
and the ‘interest of internet users in having access to information’ on the other as the 
opposing interests in this case. It noted that while ‘as a general rule’ the data subject’s right to 
privacy and data protection override the interest of internet users in having access to 
information, the balance in specific cases may depend on other factors, such as the nature of 
the data and whether the public had an interest in it.
27
 It therefore held that, if necessary to 
comply with Articles 12(b) and 14(a), a search engine operator must remove links to web 
pages which are indexed when a person is searched for by name even if those web pages are 
themselves lawful.  
The Court advanced several factors to support this finding. Most significantly, it stated that a 
search engine operator does not appear to benefit from the derogation to the Directive for 
processing carried out ‘solely for journalistic purposes’.28 It also stated that the balancing 
exercises conducted under Articles 7(f) and 14(a) differ depending on whether the processing 
is conducted by a publisher or a search engine operator because processing by a search 
engine is likely to constitute a more significant interference with the right to privacy than 
publication on a web page.
29
  
Having determined the extent of the responsibility of a search engine operator pursuant to 
these provisions, the Court considered the scope of the rights granted to data subjects. In 
particular, it considered whether the removal of links could be justified on the basis that the 
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information they contained may be prejudicial to the data subject or that he simply wished it 
to be forgotten. The Court reiterated that when a data subject makes a request pursuant to 
Article 12(b), the compatibility of the processing with the Directive is dependent upon 
compliance with the Article 6 safeguards (therefore processing must not be irrelevant, 
excessive, outdated etc).
30
 Equally, if Article 7(f) is relied upon to legitimise data processing, 
the processing must be authorised on this basis for the entire period during which it is carried 
out.
31
 The Court therefore emphasised that when appraising requests opposing data 
processing, the individual’s right is not contingent on this indexed information causing 
prejudice to him or her.
32
 The Court concluded that the fundamental rights to privacy and 
data protection should, ‘as a rule’ override both the economic interest of the search engine 
operator as well as the interest of the general public in finding the information.
33
 However, in 
certain circumstances, there may be a preponderant interest of the general public (for 
instance, if the individual concerned was a public figure).
34
 The Court advised the Spanish 
referring Court, who would ultimately decide on this matter, that no such preponderant 
interest appeared to exist in the case before it, highlighting the sensitivity of the information 
in question for the data subject’s private life and that its initial publication had taken place 16 
years previously.
35
  
The Court’s judgment has significant normative and practical implications, all of which it is 
impossible to catalogue. This comment shall focus on the following: the continued use of the 
misleading ‘right to be forgotten’ label in the wake of the judgment, the judgment’s 
implications for the development of the Charter’s right to data protection and its relevance  to 
‘Cyber-lawyers’.   
THE MISLEADING ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’ LABEL  
In finding that a search engine’s obligation to remove links relating to an individual from its 
index  is not contingent on that indexed information causing prejudice to the individual, the 
Court was not finding that a ‘right to be forgotten’ exists. Rather, it follows from the Court’s 
judgment that such prejudice is neither necessary nor sufficient: the right to delete only 
applies when the data processing is incompatible with the Directive. To label such a right a 
‘right to be forgotten’ is misleading.  
Moreover, while the findings of the Court appeared, at first sight, to depart from those of the 
Advocate General on this matter, both in fact agreed that an individual has no general right to 
prevent the indexing by internet search engines of potentially prejudicial personal 
information available on third party web pages.
 The Advocate General’s examination was 
limited to the question of whether ‘a subjective preference alone’36 amounts to a compelling 
legitimate ground within the meaning of Article 14(a) and therefore whether the processing 
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was compatible with the Directive. On this narrow question of whether ‘subjective preference 
alone’ should be decisive, the Court agreed with him that it should not.  
This critical distinction between, on the one hand, the right to erasure if processing is 
incompatible with the provisions of the Directive and, on the other, a right to be forgotten 
based on an individual’s personal preferences has not been adequately recognised and has 
enabled the judgment’s implications to be exaggerated. For instance, in its report on the 
subject, the House of Lords EU Committee misinterprets the European Commission’s 
intervention in the proceedings. The Commission had argued that the Article 12(b) right to 
delete applies where processing does not comply with the Directive ‘from which it follows 
that this right does not confer on the data subject an absolute right…simply because he 
believes that this may be prejudicial to him, or because he wishes the information to be 
consigned to oblivion’.37 The Commission was clearly here highlighting the distinction made 
above and not, as the Committee report suggests, arguing against the Court’s ultimate 
finding. This misleading ‘right to be forgotten’ label should therefore be abandoned.  
MAKING AN ENTRANCE: THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for a right to data protection alongside, but 
independently of, the established right to privacy. The relationship between these two rights 
is contested, with some arguing that data protection is merely a subset of the right to privacy 
while others advocate that it is an independent right. For instance, in the UK data protection 
has traditionally been treated as a facet of privacy
38 
although the distinction between the two 
rights was highlighted by a High Court judge in 2013 in order to limit the justiciability of the 
Charter right to data protection in the UK.
39 
The EU Courts have consistently conflated the 
rights to data protection and privacy, thereby further muddying the waters. While in this case 
the Court continued to refer to the rights to data protection and privacy in the singular, its 
judgment provides an indication of the additional role it foresees for the right to data 
protection in the EU legal order.   
The judgment provides implicit support for the recognition of ‘control over personal data’, 
irrespective of whether these personal data are ‘private’, as a fundamental aspect of the right 
to data protection. Data protection experts have long-suggested that this control, sometimes 
referred to in stronger terms as ‘informational self-determination’, is a central aspect of data 
protection. Indeed, the idea of ‘informational self-determination’ is one which was 
recognised by the German Constitutional Court in 1983 in its Population Census decision’40 
when the Court found that individuals must, in principle, have the capacity to determine 
whether their data are disclosed and the use to which they are put. Nevertheless, there are no 
references to this ‘informational self-determination’ or even the notion of ‘control’ in the 
wording of the Charter right to data protection or in the Data Protection Directive. ‘Enhanced 
individual control’ has however featured prominently in the discourse regarding the data 
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protection reform package currently making its way (slowly) through the European 
legislative process. Recital 6 of the Proposed Regulation states that ‘Individuals should have 
control over their own personal data’ and reflects the Commission’s stated aim to ‘put 
individuals in control of their own data’.41 An additional recital suggested by the European 
Parliament rapporteur which stated that the right to the protection of personal data is based on 
the right of the data subject to exert control over the personal data that are being processed’ 
would have made this control dimension even more explicit however it was removed from 
the final text agreed upon by Parliament.
42
  
In addition to this elucidation of the normative underpinning of the right to data protection, 
the judgment also seeks to enhance the practical effectiveness of this right.
43
 The Court’s 
refusal to incorporate the subjective element of ‘awareness’ into the notion of ‘data 
controller’ as suggested by the Advocate General is just one such example. The Court instead 
preferred to adopt a literal interpretation of this concept in order to preserve the Directive’s 
broad scope of application, emphasising the importance of this broad scope for the 
effectiveness of data protection rules.
44
 Perhaps more critically, in finding that Google may 
be under an obligation to remove links, the Court held that the effective and complete 
protection of individuals could not be achieved if these individuals were required to also have 
this information erased from the initial host publisher.
45
   
The Court’s implicit endorsement of individual control over personal data and its explicit 
emphasis on the effectiveness of the right to data protection have been welcomed by data 
protection and privacy advocates. However, as is often the case when the law seeks to 
regulate technology, it may be too late. In an era of Big Data and ambient technologies it is 
arguably naïve to believe that individuals can exercise effective control over their personal 
data. Constructs which are central to the effectiveness of data protection law  are challenged 
by these societal developments: for instance, the principle of ‘purpose limitation’ pursuant to 
which data should be collected for ‘specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with these purposes’46 directly contradicts the logic of Big 
Data, which is to mine huge volumes of data (including personal data) to discover 
correlations. In this case, the Advocate General encouraged the Court to reject what he 
termed a ‘maximalist approach’ to data protection rules47, as it had done in Lindqvist48, 
highlighting that the Directive had been drafted in a pre-Internet era.
49
 Likewise, scholars 
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such as Koops have argued that data protection law is based on a number of fallacies, 
including that it can be effective and can promote individual control over personal data. 
Koops argues that in order to survive data protection must begin to look in other regulatory 
directions.
50
 While this may be true, it is not reflected in the current data protection reform 
package which further complicates the data protection law thicket and does little to clarify 
how data protection should be reconciled with competing interests, such as innovation.  
The Court’s alleged failure to reconcile the right to data protection with the competing rights 
to receive and impart information has also been criticised. While the Court acknowledged the 
‘decisive role’ played by search engines in disseminating data51, its failure to refer directly to 
the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 EU Charter 
is remarkable. The Court stresses the privacy and data protection implications of search 
engine operators’ ability to aggregate information, create personal profiles and to widely and 
easily disseminate these aggregated profiles.
52
 However, it does not acknowledge that the 
removal of data from a search engine rather than a web page also has more significant 
freedom of expression implications for the very same reasons: it prevents easy access to data 
for a larger number of individuals. While not explicitly stated, the Court appears to assume 
that when the rights to privacy and data protection are at stake the right to freedom of 
expression extends only to ‘public interest’ information – as opposed to information in which 
the public may have an interest. Again, it is suggested that this finding is entirely consistent 
with data protection’s role of enhancing individual control over personal data. Nevertheless, 
it puts the EU on a collision course with the United States where the First Amendment right 
to freedom of speech is treated as an ‘argumentative showstopper’. Perhaps ironically given 
the firm rejection of European-style rights balancing in First Amendment jurisprudence and 
scholarship, the judgment has attracted a lot of criticism in the United States for its failure to 
grant adequate weight to the right to freedom of expression. The judgment is possibly best 
viewed as an attempt by the Court of Justice to establishes data protection as Europe’s 
‘argumentative showstopper’ in the wake of international data protection and privacy 
scandals.  
A TEXTBOOK CASE-STUDY FOR CYBER-REGULATION?   
The judgment also provides plenty of food for thought for those working in the field of 
Internet law and may even provide a further basis to respond to Easterbrook’s scathing 
critique of Cyberlaw: that it is as useful as the Law of the Horse. Several of the challenges 
regulators and search engines are grappling with in the aftermath of this judgment – online 
jurisdiction, decentred regulation and the responsibilities of internet intermediaries – are 
familiar issues to Cyberlawyers.   
The Court’s functional approach to the territorial scope of the Data Protection Directive 
enabled the Spanish DPA  to assume jurisdiction in the present case. This approach may be 
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relatively uncontroversial when the data controller is based within the EU and hence EU data 
protection rules de facto apply. However, the judgment raises two more controversial 
jurisdiction issues. First, the judgment enables the EU to claim jurisdiction over processing 
which occurs outside the EU borders when the data controller has a relevant revenue-
generating subsidiary in the EU even if the decisions regarding data processing are taken 
beyond EU borders. Secondly, it begs the question of whether the judgment requires Google 
to modify its search results globally or to attempt to identify Google users within the EU 
through territorial domain name extensions or geographic filtering tools. Imposing an 
obligation on Google to modify its Google.com search results may appear like a 
disproportionate expansion of the EU’s jurisdiction given the accuracy of filtering techniques 
yet such an approach has been supported by the EU’s influential Article 29 Working Party.53 
Such territorial differentiation is not new
54
 but does further balkanise the internet which is 
arguably becoming increasingly less global in nature.  
In practice, the Court’s judgment also imposes an obligation on Google to determine whether 
particular personal data is in the ‘public interest’, a task traditionally vested in trusted public 
authorities rather than private enterprises governed by commercial imperatives. Such 
‘decentred’ regulation is commonplace online but poses particular challenges. In this 
instance, it allows a private entity to define the contours of a public debate: Google has done 
this by, first, framing the question for consideration and, second, influencing the forum for 
debate.Google has set about examining ‘How should one person’s right to be forgotten be 
balanced with the public’s right to information?’.55 This framing of the question is 
problematic. First, it refers to a ‘right to be forgotten’ which, as discussed above, is 
misleading. Secondly, it pits data protection as an individual right against freedom of 
expression as a societal right. However, data protection and privacy, like freedom of 
expression, serve societal objectives by preventing the chilling of individual behaviour. 
Moreover, Google has influenced the forum for debate by establishing an ‘Advisory Council’ 
which held a European road show canvassing opinion in order to ‘help it navigate the issue’. 
This proactive attempt to engage with interested members of the public has been criticised as 
Google has ‘handpicked the members of the council, will control who is in the audience, and 
what comes out of the meetings’.56 Finally, the judgment raises queries regarding Google’s 
status as an internet intermediary in the context of its provision of search engine services and 
whether, as such, it should benefit from intermediary liability exemption. Indeed, the 
Advocate General opined that the Google search engine is a passive intermediary which has 
‘no relationship with the content of the third-party source web pages which it copies’.57 In 
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reaching this conclusion, the Advocate General pointed to recital 47 of the Data Protection 
Directive as well as Articles 12 to 14 of the E-Commerce Directive
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 which suggest that 
facilitating the technical transmission of content does not create control over this content.
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Further support for the proposition that Google’s search engine services benefit from such 
intermediary liability could be garnered from the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in 
Google v Louis Vuitton which was not referred to in the present case.
60
 Advocate General 
Maduro suggested that the aim of the intermediary liability provisions was to create a ‘free 
and open public domain on the interent’ by limiting the liability of neutral intermediaries.61 
He provided Google’s search engine as an example of such a neutral service to which the 
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intermediary liability is therefore not as incongruous a finding as one may initially assume.   
CONCLUSION  
Depending on one’s point of view, the judgment’s implicit emphasis on individual control 
over personal data and explicit emphasis on the effectiveness of the right to data protection 
may be seen as either the first step in the resurrection of a floundering data protection regime 
or its last gasp. The judgment is certainly divisive. In the hearing before the House of Lords 
EU Select Committee, invited witnesses disagreed on whether Google should be viewed as a 
data controller and on the feasibility of implementing the judgment. The Committee’s report, 
concluded that a ‘right to be forgotten…is as elusive as its name is misleading’.65  
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